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Independence Issues Committee
Description of Proposed ISB Staff Announcement
Meeting Date: June 8, 1999
Auditor Performance of Investment Management Services for Nonclient
Employee Benefit Plans Sponsored by a Client Employer
Background
The ISB staff recently received an inquiry about auditor performance of investment
management services for nonclient employee benefit plans sponsored by a client
employer, and gave its informal response. The staff understands this response is different
from that being given to similar questions by the AICPA's Professional Ethics Division.
Therefore, the staff believes it would be both appropriate and helpful on this emerging
issue for the ISB staff to publicly announce its view at the next IIC meeting, and to
include that view in the meeting minutes so that the public may be made aware of the
public company issue and of the answer they should expect if they call the staff for
advice.
In its recently issued May 1999 "Journal of Accountancy," the AICPA's Professional
Ethics Executive Committee published a new Ethics Interpretation 101-3, including
sections on "Investment - Advisory or Management" services and "Benefit Plan
Administration" services. This new pronouncement does not address the intersection of
investment management services and benefit plan services - the specific fact pattern of
the question received by the ISB staff.
Issue
Can an auditor perform investment management services for a nonaudit client employee
defined contribution or defined benefit plan, without impairing the auditor's
independence with respect to the sponsoring client employer?
Note: While the scope of services to be performed in the question the staff received was
not made clear, we assumed with the requester that these services were to be of a
sufficient depth such that they would cause an independence impairment if performed
directly for the client sponsor itself. That is, the question addressed by the staff was
limited to whether performing such substantive services for the plan, rather than for the
employer, would impair the independence of the auditor of the sponsor. The staff was
not asked to, and did not, address specifically what types of services cause an
independence impairment when performed directly for the client, which is a much
broader question.
Informal ISB Staff View - Proposed Announcement
Assuming that the investment management services to be performed for a nonclient
employee benefit plan would be sufficient to cause an independence impairment if

performed directly for the client sponsor itself, the ISB staff believes that performance of
such services at the plan level would impair the auditor's independence with regard to its
audit of the sponsor. This applies to both defined contribution and defined benefit plans.
As mentioned above, the staff has not attempted to address the broader question of what
type or level of investment management or advisory services for a client cause an
independence impairment.
We acknowledge that benefit plans have separate legal identities, but we believe that, for
independence purposes, there is a strong enough inter-relationship between the plan and
the sponsor to attribute a significant portion of the auditor's investment management
effort to a sponsor management role. That is, the plan sponsor created the plan, can
amend it to increase or decrease benefits, and can terminate the plan. Also, the plan's
participants are present and former employees of the sponsor, and the plan often may
hold a major portion of the employees' net worth and thus, as a part of the sponsor's
compensation program, provide significant motivation to the workforce. Therefore, if the
auditor performs what would be a management role for the plan, we believe that should
be viewed similarly to performing a management role directly for the sponsor, which in
turn would be viewed as creating a mutuality of interest and impairing independence.
We also believe that our broad concerns described above relate to both defined
contribution and defined benefit plans. This is even though the threats to independence
are more direct for defined benefit plans because they directly affect the financial
statements of the client sponsor (and therefore introduce a stronger threat of the auditor
reviewing his own work). Even for a defined contribution plan, where changes in the
value of the assets affect only the participant accounts, and where the participants
themselves direct the investments, there still, as described above, is a strong enough link
to the performance of a sponsor management role to impair independence.

